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Abstract
We revisit Uribe’s[32] ‘ﬁscal theory of sovereign risk,’ which suggests a trade-oﬀ between
stabilizing inﬂation and suppressing default. Unlike Uribe[32], we develop a class of dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium models in which the ﬁscal surplus is endogenous, but where
the default mechanism follows Uribe[32] with nominal rigidities. We ﬁnd that an optimal
monetary and ﬁscal policy, in which both the nominal interest rate and the tax rate are
policy instruments, not only stabilizes inﬂation and the output gap, but also default through
stabilizing the ﬁscal surplus. Thus, there is not necessarily a trade-oﬀ between stabilizing
inﬂation and suppressing default.
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1 Introduction
Uribe[32] argues that if a central bank’s policy is to peg the price level, government surrenders
its ability to inﬂate away the real value of nominal public liabilities; therefore, public debt default
becomes inevitable. Alternatively, if the central bank’s policy is to peg the nominal interest
rate, the government preserves its ability to suppress public debt default, but is no longer able
to stabilize the price level. This argument, known as Uribe’s[32] ﬁscal theory of sovereign risk
(FTSR), encompassing a stabilizing of inﬂation (SI) and a suppressing of default (SD) trade-oﬀ
(SI—SD trade-oﬀ), may be consistent with the intuition of most readers. However, we ﬁnd that
there is not necessarily an SI—SD trade-oﬀ, and even if there is, it is not as severe as that suggested
by Uribe[32]. Consequently, inﬂation stabilization is consistent with default suppression, given that
default risk could be mitigated through stabilizing inﬂation, and this result diﬀers markedly from
that in Uribe[32]. We can then practically resolve the SI—SD trade-oﬀ by adopting an optimal
monetary and ﬁscal (OMF) policy where both nominal interest and tax rates are available as
policy instruments to minimize welfare costs, mostly through stabilizing inﬂation. This is our most
important policy contribution. In our model, while we do adopt Uribe’s[32] default mechanism,
we refocus our attention on the ﬁscal balance, which is treated as an exogenous shock in Uribe[32].
We then note that it is this exogenous setting that generates Uribe’s[32] result that there is an SI—
SD trade-oﬀ. The most important mechanism in our model is endogenized production, which is a
commonplace setting in the literature on optimal monetary policy in the dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium (DSGE) established by Woodford[33]. This makes the ﬁscal balance endogenous and
generates a policy implication quite unlike that in Uribe[32]. Thus, the diﬀerence in results and/or
policy implications between our analysis and that in Uribe[32] depends on the assumption of
exogenous or endogenous production.
In the pertinent context of the current European sovereign debt crisis, the conduct of monetary
policy appears extremely diﬃcult in such circumstances. For example, even if Greece did not
default when it revealed its huge ﬁscal deﬁcit in October 2009, when its 10-year credit default
swap premium began to soar and reached USD 20,404 on April 2012, the European Central Bank
(ECB) faced increasing diﬃculty in conducting monetary policy. Subsequently, the harmonized
consumer price index (HCPI) inﬂation rate started to increase from -0.6% in July 2009, while the
ECB’s policy interest rate (the short-run buying operation rate) remained at 1% until April 2011,
even when HCPI inﬂation was 2.8%. The ECB thus seemed reluctant to stabilize inﬂation because
of the continuing sovereign debt problem in Greece.1
In this paper, we conﬁrm the work in Uribe[32] by developing a class of DSGE models with
nominal rigidities. We use this to compare the optimal monetary (OM) and OMF policies with
the interest rate spread-minimizing (MIS) policy, a policy that minimizes the interest rate spread;
i.e., the diﬀerence between the nominal interest rate for safe assets and the government debt yield
excluding default risk in an economy with sovereign risk. Note that both the OM and OMF policies
correspond to the Taylor rule and the price level targeting in Uribe[32] because they are both de
facto inﬂation stabilization policies, whereas the MIS policy corresponds to the interest rate peg
in Uribe[32] because these policies either minimize or set the expected default rate to zero.
1In fact, in a speech in December 2011, Vitor Constaˆncio, vice-president of the ECB, observed that while inﬂation
was likely to remain above 2% for several months, the sovereign debt crisis was ongoing; therefore, the Governing
Council of the ECB decided to reduce the monetary policy rate by 25 basis points. It also began to take a series of
measures to improve liquidity provision and prevent a possible liquidity crisis. See ECB [17].
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We ﬁrst review Uribe’s[32] FTSR. By iterating the government budget constraint forward and
imposing an appropriate transversality condition, Uribe[32] demonstrates that the default rate
depends on the ratio of the net present value of the real ﬁscal surplus to real government debt with
interest payment. That is, the default rate depends on government solvency. Thus, a decrease in the
ﬁscal surplus, which is exogenous in this setting, decreases government solvency. Facing this case, if
the central bank stabilizes inﬂation, it cannot mitigate the burden of government debt redemption
and the default rate increases. Alternatively, if the central bank gives up trying to stabilize
inﬂation, it can mitigate the burden of government debt redemption by inﬂation. This decreases
real government debt, thereby lessening the possibility of default. This is Uribe’s[32] FTSR, as
hinted at by the ‘ﬁscal theory of price level’ in Cochrane[13], Leeper[24], and Woodford[34], and
indeed shows that there is an SI—SD trade-oﬀ.
How then does endogenized production derive quite diﬀerent results? First, recall that the
ﬁscal surplus is the diﬀerence between tax revenue and government expenditure, and suppose that
a tax, which is one of the OMF policy instruments in our analysis, is levied on output and that
government expenditure is exogenous. The most important thing here is that the ﬁscal surplus not
only acutely involves the default rate, but also inﬂation through the output gap. That is, stabilizing
the ﬁscal surplus steadies not only the default rate, but also both inﬂation and the output gap.
Note that the OM and OMF policies are de facto inﬂation stabilization policies because inﬂation
volatility determines welfare costs stemming from household utility.
Then, suppose that there is an increase in government expenditure, which is exogenous, and
the policy authorities, being the government and the central bank, adopt the OMF policy, where
the nominal interest and tax rates are policy instruments. Because production is endogenous, the
ﬁscal surplus is now also endogenous. Facing an increase in government expenditure, which applies
pressure to increasing inﬂation because government expenditure increases the GDP gap through
an increase in the marginal cost, the government hikes the tax rate to decrease the GDP gap
by lowering consumption. As a result, the central bank completely removes the inﬂation—output
gap trade-oﬀ because its policy instrument is the nominal interest rate (the basic mechanism for
stabilizing inﬂation in DSGE models with Calvo pricing will be familiar to most readers; thus,
we skip to explaining why stabilizing the output gap stabilizes inﬂation). Although an increase
in government expenditure applies pressure to worsening the ﬁscal deﬁcit, the increased taxation
cancels this out, so the ﬁscal deﬁcit improves. Further, because the ﬁscal deﬁcit is almost zero
as a result, and the ﬁscal balance stabilizes more than under the OM policy where the tax rate
is constant over time, the default rate is roughly zero. In short, the more stabilized is inﬂation,
the more stabilized is the default rate, and vice versa, under the OMF policy. Thus, there is not
necessarily an SI—SD trade-oﬀ.
We do not necessarily reject Uribe[32] because we can clearly replicate the SI—SD trade-oﬀ under
the OM policy, which corresponds to the Taylor rule in Uribe[32]. Under the OM policy, facing an
increase in government expenditure, inﬂation is stabilized (it ﬂuctuates more than under the OMF
policy because only the nominal interest rate is available to stabilize inﬂation). However, because
the tax rate is constant over time, the tax rate does not increase, the ﬁscal deﬁcit worsens, and the
default rate increases dramatically. Thus, there is an SI—SD trade-oﬀ. What about the MIS policy
corresponding to the interest rate peg in Uribe[32]? Under the MIS policy, and as in Uribe[32],
the interest rate spread is zero. Because the nominal interest rate for safe assets deﬁnitely falls
in line with the nominal interest rate for risky assets–i.e., government debt yield–the expected
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default rate is stabilized. In addition, because we assume that the policy authorities commit to
their policies, the actual default rate over time is zero. Accordingly, although the default rate
is completely stabilized, inﬂation rises through an increase in the output gap when government
expenditure increases. Thus, there is an SI—SD trade-oﬀ similar to that in Uribe[32].
However, the SI—SD trade-oﬀ that we ﬁnd is not as severe as that suggested in Uribe[32]. We
calculate the volatilities on inﬂation and the default rate under the OM, OMF, and MIS policies for
several plausible levels of price stickiness. First, under the OMF policy, both volatilities are quite
low and do not depend on price stickiness (in particular, the volatility on inﬂation is certainly zero).
Second, under the OM policy, the volatility on the default rate is quite high for any plausible price
stickiness, even though inﬂation is well stabilized, unlike the MIS policy. Finally, under the MIS
policy, the volatility on the default rate is deﬁnitely zero, while the inﬂation volatility depends on
price stickiness, such that the greater the price stickiness, the less the inﬂation volatility, and vice
versa. In addition, if price stickiness is quite high, such as 0.95, which implies that the duration
of price revision is 5 years, the volatility on inﬂation is close to zero. Because the volatility on the
default rate is deﬁnitely zero, the SI—SD trade-oﬀ that we ﬁnd is not as severe as that suggested in
Uribe[32]. Summing up, our results are: i) there is not necessarily an SI—SD trade-oﬀ and ii) the
trade-oﬀ is not as severe as that suggested in Uribe[32]. As policy implications, we argue: i) we
can practically solve the SI—SD trade-oﬀ by adopting the OMF policy and ii) the MIS policy does
not represent an inferior policy from the viewpoint of dissolving the SI—SD trade-oﬀ if the price
stickiness is suﬃciently high.
We now discuss the relationship between our analysis and previous work addressing sovereign
risk or crises in the ﬁeld of macroeconomics. First, Arellano[2] develops a model in which the
default probability depends on some stochastic process and shows that default is more likely in
recessions. She succeeds in matching her model with Argentinian data and her assumption concern-
ing the default mechanism is subsequently applied by Mendoza and Yue[25] and Corsetti, Kuester,
Meier, and Mueller[15]. In their analysis, Mendoza and Yue[25] attempt to explain the negative
relationship between output and default observed in the data. That is, they clarify the reason why
deep recessions often accompany sovereign default. For their part, Corsetti, Kuester, Meier, and
Mueller[15] develop a model including ﬁnancial intermediaries and demonstrate that sovereign risk
may give rise to indeterminacy. They use this to imply that ﬁscal retrenchment via government
spending cuts can help to curtail the risk of macroeconomic instability and, in extreme cases, even
stimulate economic activity. Their model stems from Curdia and Woodford[16], and is inclusive of
the zero lower bound of nominal interest rates.
Subsequently, Corsetti and Dedola[14] develop a model for a sovereign debt crisis driven by
either self-fulﬁlling expectations or weak fundamentals, and analyze the mechanism through which
either conventional or unconventional monetary policy can preclude the former. Their ﬁnding
that swapping government debt for monetary liabilities can prevent self-fulﬁlling debt crises is one
of several unconventional monetary policies. Elsewhere, and similar to our analysis, Bacchetta,
Perazzi, and Wincoop[3] develop a class of DSGE models and analyze both conventional and
unconventional monetary policies. They ﬁnd that the central bank cannot credibly avoid a self-
fulﬁlling debt crisis.
Our analysis diﬀers from this earlier body of work in several ways. Except for Corsetti and
Dedola[14] and Bacchetta, Perazzi, and Wincoop[3], the main concern in all these analyses is how
sovereign default aﬀects the macroeconomic dynamics, especially those for output, whereas we
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focus on how the OMF policy aﬀects default risk. In addition, although Corsetti and Dedola[14]
and Bacchetta, Perazzi, and Wincoop[3] analyze monetary policy, they do not consider ﬁscal policy
nor how to use it as a stabilization or welfare cost-minimization tool. Thus, our purposes are not
identical, and we can say that we propose monetary and ﬁscal policies to both stabilize inﬂation
and suppress default risk, whereas these related studies propose monetary policy only to suppress
default risk.2
We also emphasize that while previous work in the area obtains important implications, none
examines the SI—SD trade-oﬀ in detail. While Uribe[32] certainly discusses the trade-oﬀ, we em-
phasize that there is not necessarily a trade-oﬀ. Needless to say, neither Uribe[32] nor Corsetti,
Kuester, Meier, and Mueller[15] nor Mendoza and Yue[25] derive this same result. Consequently,
examining the trade-oﬀ, and deriving useful policy implications from the viewpoint of solving the
SI—SD trade-oﬀ in this paper, is truly novel.
Finally, we would like to mention that it is not necessarily diﬃcult to talk about default in the
closed economy setting we employ. For instance, Burnside, Eichenbaumb, and Rebelo[11] show that
a currency crisis stemming from debt deﬂation, which is a more important source of government
income than seigniorage, and introducing indexation does not aﬀect the qualitative results in their
calibrations.3 Elsewhere, Reinhart and Rogoﬀ[29] show that there have been at least 250 sovereign
debt defaults worldwide since 1800, with domestic liabilities rapidly increasing ﬁve years before
default in 89 of these cases. In addition, they ﬁnd that governments deprived domestic residents
more after 1940. Thus, considering default risk in a closed economy setting is not improper.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the model and Section
3 deﬁnes the policy targets under the three policies discussed earlier. Section 4 solves the linear—
quadratic (LQ) problem and provides the ﬁrst-order necessary conditions (FONCs) for the policy
authorities. Section 5 calibrates the model under the three policies and Section 6 clariﬁes the
SI—SD trade-oﬀ for each. Section 7 concludes the paper. The appendices provide some additional
analysis. Appendix A, which provides counterfactual exercises to clarify how the endogenized ﬁscal
surplus yields results diﬀerent from Uribe[32]. This is because our model diﬀers, not only in this
sense, but also in terms of nominal rigidities and elsewhere. Appendix B examines the steady state
and Appendices C to F provide some empirical evidence.
2 The Model
We introduce ﬁrms into Uribe’s[32] model and develop a class of DSGE models with nominal
rigidities following Gali and Monacelli[21], although we also assume a closed economy.4 Thus, the
default mechanism is quite similar to Uribe[32]. We follow Benigno[4] (being an earlier working
paper version of Benigno[6]) to clarify the households’ choice of risky assets. The household i on the
2Furthermore, they do not focus on ﬁscal policy (their models are unsuitable for analyzing ﬁscal policy regardless),
whereas our model can analyze and evaluate the eﬀect of ﬁscal policy. In terms of other diﬀerences, the government
in Arellano[2] does not levy taxes on any economic agents, while Mendoza and Yue[25], Corsetti, Kuester, Meier,
and Mueller[15] and Bacchetta, Perazzi and Wincoop[3] assume either lump-sum taxes or transfers. Thus, under
their settings, it is not possible to analyze ﬁscal policy. In contrast, in our work, government changes the tax rate
to minimize welfare costs, so we can analyze ﬁscal policy speciﬁcally. As a result, we can easily observe the eﬀects
of the OMF policy on default. This is the main advantage of our analysis over these existing studies from the
viewpoint of model building.
3Uribe[32] also cites Burnside, Eichenbaumb, and Rebelo[11] and justiﬁes the closed economy setting when
analyzing default.
4Following Ferrero[18], we introduce government into Gali and Monacelli[21]. In other words, the model is a
closed economy version of Okano[28].
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interval i ∈ [0, 1] supplies labor and owns ﬁrms that maximize their proﬁt by choosing an optimal
price in a monopolistically competitive market. The pricing behavior follows Calvo pricing. We
assume that a tax is levied on output and is distorted. Thus, monopolistic power remains, and the
steady state is distorted, unlike Gali and Monacelli[21].
2.1 Households
A representative household’s preference is given by:
U ≡ E0

∞
t=0
βtUt

, (1)
where Ut ≡ lnCt −
1
1+ϕN
1+ϕ
t denotes the period utility, Et is the expectation conditional on the
information set at period t, β ∈ (0, 1) is the subjective discount factor, Ct is the consumption
index, Nt ≡
 1
0
Nt (i) dh is the hours of labor, and ϕ is the inverse of the elasticity of labor supply.
The consumption index of the continuum of diﬀerentiated goods is as follows:
Ct ≡
 1
0
Ct (i)
ε−1
ε di
 ε
ε−1
, (2)
where ε > 1 is the elasticity of substitution across goods.
The price level is deﬁned as follows:
Pt ≡
 1
0
Pt (i)
1−ε
dh
 1
1−ε
. (3)
The maximization of Eq.(1) is subject to a sequence of intertemporal budget constraint of the
form:
Rt−1D
n
t−1 +R
G
t−1B
n
t−1 (1− δt) +WtNt + PRt ≥
 1
0
Pt (i)Ct (i) di+D
n
t + B
n
t , (4)
where Rt ≡ 1 + rt denotes the gross (risk-free) nominal interest rate, R
G
t ≡ RtΓ (−spt) the
government debt coupon rate, rt the net interest rate , andD
n
t is the nominal safety assets issued by
households, Bnt is nominal government debt, Wt is the nominal wage, PRt denotes proﬁts from the
ownership of the ﬁrms, δt is the default rate, spt ≡
SPt
SP
−1 is the percentage deviation of the (real)
ﬁscal surplus from its steady-state value, SPt ≡ τtYt−Gt denotes the (real) ﬁscal surplus, τt denotes
the tax rate, Yt ≡
 1
0
Yt (i)
ε−1
ε di
	 ε
ε−1
denotes (aggregated) output, and Gt ≡

 1
0
Gt (i)
ε−1
ε di
 ε
ε−1
denotes (aggregate) government expenditure. Furthermore, we deﬁne V as the steady-state value
of any variables Vt and vt as the percentage deviation of Vt from its steady-state value. Thus,
SP is the steady-state value of the ﬁscal surplus. The second term on the left-hand side (LHS) in
Eq.(4) implies that the government may default on the share of δt and households cannot obtain
RGt−1B
n
t−1δt if the government defaults.
Now we discuss the government debt coupon rate RGt ≡ RtΓ (−spt), where Γ
′ (−spt) > 0 by
assumption. Our assumption implies that government decides the coupon rate for government
debt depending on its ﬁscal situation, such that if this worsens, the government increases the
coupon rate. Note that the government debt coupon rate RGt is not the government debt yield,
which is fully endogenized. In our setting, the government debt yield is decided by households’
5
intertemporal optimal condition; i.e., the Euler equation. Thus, the government debt yield is
decided endogenously, although the government debt coupon rate depends on our assumption.
As discussed, the function Γ (−spt) is hinted at by Benigno[4], although the details somewhat
diﬀer. Benigno[4] assumes that households in the home country face a burden in international
ﬁnancial markets in being charged a premium on the foreign interest rate as borrowers and receiv-
ing remuneration less than the foreign interest rate as lenders. Following his setting, Benigno[4]
assumes Γ′ (·) < 0, which implies that the higher the foreign country’s government debt, the lower
the remuneration for holding the foreign country’s government debt.5 In contrast, our setting
implies that the lower the ﬁscal surplus, the less the remuneration for holding government debt
due to default risk, which in turn harms capital and makes households hesitate to hold government
debt. The government then must pay additional remuneration to households to motivate them to
hold government debt. Thus, we assume that Γ′ (·) > 0. That is, the lower the ﬁscal surplus, the
higher the interest rate multiplier. Another assumption that diﬀers from Benigno[4] is that Γ (·) is
a function of the ﬁscal surplus, whereas Benigno[4] assumes that it is a function of current govern-
ment debt with an interest payment; i.e., RtBt. Our setting for Γ (·) indirectly follows Corsetti,
Kuester, Meier, and Mueller[15]. Corsetti, Kuester, Meier, and Mueller[15] assume that the higher
the ﬁscal deﬁcit, the greater the probability of default, and vice versa. If we are given that the
higher the probability of default, the higher the government debt coupon rate, our assumption that
Γ (·) is a decreasing function of the ﬁscal surplus is consistent with their assumption in that it im-
plies that the higher the ﬁscal surplus, the higher the government debt coupon rate. Furthermore,
our setting for Γ (·) is supported by some empirical evidence. We analyze whether a ﬁscal deﬁcit
or government debt with interest payment increases the interest rate multiplier Γ (·) using Greek
data. These data imply that the ﬁscal deﬁcit, but not government debt with interest payment,
increases Γ (·).6 Thus, our assumption regarding Γ (·) is consistent with both some existing work
and the available data.
By solving the cost-minimization problems for households, we obtain the optimal allocation of
expenditures as follows:
Ct (i) =

Pt (i)
Pt
−ε
Ct. (5)
Once we account for Eq.(5), the intertemporal budget constraint can be rewritten as:
Rt−1D
n
t−1 +R
G
t−1B
n
t−1 (1− δt) +WtNt + PRt ≥ PtCt +D
n
t +B
n
t .
The households maximize their utility subject to their budget constraint. The optimality
conditions for the household’s problem are:
βEt

PtCt
Pt+1Ct+1

=
1
Rt
, (6)
which is the intertemporal optimality condition–i.e., the Euler equation–and:
CtN
ϕ
t =
Wt
Pt
, (7)
5Benigno[4] observes that this function, which depends only on the level of real government bonds, captures the
costs of undertaking positions in the international asset market or the existence of intermediaries in the foreign asset
market.
6See Appendix D for details.
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which is the standard intratemporal optimality condition.
There is another intertemporal optimality condition depicting the households’ motivation to
hold government debt with default risk. We obtain this by diﬀerentiating the Lagrangian by
government nominal debt, such that:
βEt

PtCt
Pt+1Ct+1

=
1
RHt Et (1− δt+1)
. (8)
with RHt ≡ Rt

Γ (−spt) +BtΓ
′ (−spt) [B (R− 1)]
−1

, and RHt can be interpreted as the govern-
ment debt yield (excluding default risk).
Combining Eqs(6) and (8), we have:
Rt = R
H
t Et (1− δt+1) , (9)
which shows that the marginal rate of substitution for consumption is the same for households hold-
ing either (real) safety assetsDt or (real) government debt Bt because both Rt and R
H
t Et (1− δt+1)
equal the marginal rate of substitution βEt


PtCt
Pt+1Ct+1

. That is, the consumption schedule is iden-
tical irrespective of whether households hold state-contingent claims Dt or government debt Bt.
Log-linearizing Eq.(9) yields:
rˆt = rˆ
H
t − Et (δt+1) , (10)
with rˆt ≡
dRt
R
and rˆHt ≡
dRHt
RH
.
Log-linearizing government debt yield RHt , we have:
rˆHt =
ωφ
1− β
rˆt −
φωγ
1− β
spt +
φβ
1− β
bt, (11)
with ωφ ≡ 1− β (1− φ), and ωγ ≡ 1 + β (γ − 1), where φ ≡ Γ
′ (0) denotes the interest rate spread
in the steady state and γ ≡ Γ
′′(0)
Γ′(0) the elasticity of the interest rate spread to a 1% change in
the ﬁscal deﬁcit in the steady state. Following Benigno[4], we deﬁne the interest rate spread for
government debtφ and assume Γ (0) = 1. The elasticity γ is an unfamiliar parameter, and we
assume | Γ′ (·) |<| Γ′′ (·) |; thus, γ > 1. This implies that a decrease in the ﬁscal surplus increases
the government debt coupon rate via an increase in the interest rate multiplier, and vice versa, and
that changes in the government debt coupon rate are larger in absolute terms than the changes
in the ﬁscal surplus. Note that our assumption is supported by the data, which we discuss in
Appendix B, estimating the elasticity of the interest rate spread given a 1% change in the ﬁscal
deﬁcit γ.
Given our assumption, Eq.(11) implies that an increase in the ﬁscal surplus decreases the
government debt yield, and vice versa. This is intuitively consistent because an increase in ﬁscal
surplus decreases the interest rate multiplier and decreases the government debt yield. In addition,
in the third term on the right-hand side (RHS), the sign is positive. This shows that the government
debt yield is an increasing function of government debt. An increase in government debt coincides
with a decrease in the ﬁscal surplus, and vice versa. Thus, this positive sign is consistent with the
negative sign in the second term. That is, an increase in government debt increases the government
debt yield through an increase in the interest rate multiplier Γ (·), which is brought about by a
decrease in the ﬁscal surplus.
We would like to emphasize that a no-arbitrage condition is applied, as shown in Eq.(9). Thus,
even if households purchase government debt–i.e., risky assets–households can choose their op-
timal consumption schedule. Notice that the model includes Eq.(10) which is the log-linearized
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equality of Eq.(9) and that it will certainly suﬃce that there is a no-arbitrage condition. To attain
the optimal consumption schedule, households need to adjust the balance of the government debt
to meet Eq.(9). Because of RGt ≡ RtΓ (−spt), we can understand that R
H
t consists of the coupon
rate and the revenue from holding government debt. Now, suppose that RHt > R
G
t , which implies
that the coupon rate is lower than the government debt yield, and it would seem that there is no
incentive to purchase government debt from the government directly. If households purchase gov-
ernment debt, households obtain RGt .In addition, households decide their holding of government
debt, as shown in the second term of the deﬁnition of RHt ; i.e., RtBtΓ
′ (−spt) [B (R− 1)]
−1
. In this
case, RGt is low and households purchase much more debt to increase the principal and so obtain
more revenue. Purchasing government debt then causes an increase in the interest rate multiplier
through a decrease in the ﬁscal surplus. As a result, household revenue from holding government
debt corresponds to RHt as households have an incentive to purchase an amount of government
debt to meet Eq.(9). Thus, even if RHt > R
G
t , households purchase government debt because they
can choose the amount of government debt outstanding.
2.2 Government
2.2.1 Government Budget Constraint and the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level
(FTPL)
Fiscal policy consists of choosing the mix between taxes and the one-period nominal debt with
sovereign risk to ﬁnance the exogenous process of government expenditure. The ﬂow government
budget constraint is given by:
Bnt = R
G
t−1 (1− δt)B
n
t−1 −
 1
0
Pt (i) [τtYt (i)−Gt (i)] di.
Because the optimal allocation of generic goods is given by Yt (i) =


Pt(i)
Pt
−ε
Yt and Gt (i) =

Pt(i)
Pt
−ε
Gt, this equality can be rewritten as:
Bnt = R
G
t−1 (1− δt)B
n
t−1 − PtSPt.
Note that government expenditure follows an autoregressive of order one or AR(1) process; i.e.,
Et (gt+1) = ρGgt. Dividing both sides of the equality by Pt yields:
Bt = Rt−1Γ

−spt−1

(1− δt)Bt−1Π
−1
t − SPt. (12)
with Πt ≡
Pt
Pt−1
being the gross inﬂation rate. The ﬁrst term on the RHS corresponds to the amount
of redemption with the nominal interest payment and shows that the lower the past ﬁscal surplus,
the higher the interest payments, and the higher the default rate, the lower the redemption, and
vice versa.
Log-linearizing Eq.(12) yields:
bt =
1
β
rˆt−1 −
1
β
δt −
1
β
πt +
1
β
bt−1 −
1− β
β
spt −
φ
β
spt−1, (13)
where we use the log-linearized deﬁnition of the government debt coupon rate rˆGt = rˆt−φspt with
rˆGt ≡
dRGt
RG
and πt ≡ logΠt. Eq.(13) implies that not only the higher the current ﬁscal surplus, but
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also the higher the past ﬁscal surplus, the lower the current government debt because an increase
in the ﬁscal surplus decreases the interest payment via a decrease in the interest rate multiplier.
The appropriate transversality condition for government debt is:
lim
j→∞
βt+j+1Et

RGt+j (1− δt+j+1)
Pt+jBt+j
Pt+j+1

= 0.
By iterating forward the second equality in Eq.(12), plugging Eq.(6) into this iterated equality,
and imposing the appropriate transversality condition for government debt, we have:
C−1t R
G
t−1Bt−1Π
−1
t (1− δt) = C
−1
t SPt + β
RHt
RGt
Et

C−1t+1SPt+1

+ β2Et

RHt
RGt
RHt+1
RGt+1
C−1t+1SPt+1

+ · · · , (14)
which roughly shows that the burden of government debt redemption with interest payment in
terms of consumption, or that on the LHS, corresponds to the expected sum of the discounted
value of the ﬁscal surplus in terms of consumption, or the RHS, because of the transversality
condition. Here,
RHt
RGt
and so forth appear on the RHS. An increase in the government debt coupon
rate RGt then worsens the ﬁscal situation through the increase in the interest payment. Thus, R
G
t is
the denominator. An increase in the government debt yield facilitates the purchase of government
debt, even though consumption decreases. A decrease in the consumption then improves the ﬁscal
situation because it increases the ﬁscal surplus in terms of consumption. Thus, RHt appears as the
numerator. If RGt = R
H
t is applied to all t, which implies that the government debt coupon rate
corresponds to the government debt yield, Eq.(14) reduces to:
C−1t R
G
t−1Bt−1Π
−1
t (1− δt) = C
−1
t SPt + βEt

C−1t+1SPt+1

+ β2Et

C−1t+1SPt+1

+ · · · .
In this case, the burden of government debt redemption with interest payment in terms of con-
sumption simply corresponds to the expected sum of the discounted value of the ﬁscal surplus in
terms of consumption.
Eq.(14) can be rewritten as:
δt = 1−
RGt−1
RH
t−1
∞
k=0
k
h=0 β
kEt


RHt+h−1
RG
t+h−1
C−1t+kSPt+k

C−1t R
G
t−1Bt−1Π
−1
t
. (15)
Eq.(15) is our FTSR and implies that an increase in inﬂation does not necessarily occur even if
the government’s solvency is lost, and vice versa, similar to Uribe[32]. Not only inﬂation, but also
default, can mitigate the burden of government debt redemption with interest payment. Suppose
that the price level is constant and there is no inﬂation. In this situation, if the net present value
of the ﬁscal surplus in terms of consumption (the numerator) is about to fall below the burden of
government debt redemption with interest payment in terms of consumption (the denominator),
the second term on the RHS is less than unity. Simultaneously, the LHS exceeds zero; i.e., default
occurs. In other words, if the government falls insolvent while the price level is strictly stable,
default is inevitable. Uribe[32] shows the SI—SD trade-oﬀ by introducing default–i.e., sovereign
risk–into the central equation of the FTPL. Similar to Uribe[32], at ﬁrst glance, Eq.(15) also
implies that there is an SI—SD trade-oﬀ. Furthermore, he calibrates his model and compares the
Taylor rule that stabilizes inﬂation with the interest rate peg. Under the interest rate peg, the
interest rate on risky assets corresponds to the risk-free asset interest rate pegged to the steady-
state rate. This calibration shows that default ceases just one period after the shock decreasing the
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ﬁscal surplus, even though default continues under the Taylor rule after the shock. This implies
that a Taylor rule to stabilize inﬂation includes the unwelcome possibility of magnifying sovereign
risk, and this calls for an interest rate peg to counter default. Paying attention to just Eq.(15),
which is similar to that in Uribe’s[32] model, we seem to obtain policy implications quite similar
to those in Uribe[32].
We now present the relationship between our FTSR; i.e., Eq.(15) and the FTPL. If there is
neither default risk nor an interest rate multiplier in Eq.(15), Eq.(15) reduces to the following
because of RGt = R
H
t = Rt:
1 =
∞
k=0 β
kEt

C−1t+kSPt+k

C−1t Rt−1Bt−1Π
−1
t
,
which is our version of the FTPL. This implies that if solvency worsens, the price level increases;
i.e., inﬂation arises, such that the burden of government debt redemption is mitigated. For now,
we introduce sovereign risk, and this mechanism is no longer fully applicable, as Eq.(15) implies.
2.2.2 Default Rule
Because the default rate is decided endogenously, we may not say that the government chooses the
default rate following a certain rule. However, although the default rule is endogenous in Uribe[32],
Uribe[32] considers the default rule where the government does not default unless the tax-to-debt-
ratio falls below a certain threshold.7 Following this idea, we say that the default rate is decided by
the following rule. Let us deﬁne Ψ ≡
RG
t−1
RH
t−1

∞
k=0

k
h=0
RH
t+h−1
RG
t+h−1
βkEt(C−1t+kSPt+k)
C−1t R
G
t−1
Bt−1Π
−1
t
, where Ψ denotes the
threshold chosen arbitrarily by the government. Around the steady state, Ψ = 1, and we set our
threshold to one. The government chooses δt > 0 if Ψ < 1; i.e., the government defaults if solvency
worsens. The government chooses δt < 0 if Ψ > 1; i.e., the government can aﬀord not to default.
The government chooses δt = 0 if Ψ = 1.
8 Our default rule is diﬀerent from those proposed
by Uribe[32] and Bi, Leeper, and Leith[10]. Unlike Uribe[32], default in our model is consistent
with government solvency and is not an ad hoc rule.9 And unlike Bi, Leeper, and Leith[10], our
default rule considers the channel where inﬂation mitigates default. Their default rule depends
on a threshold of the ratio of debt over steady-state GDP, where the threshold is endogenously
decided and depends on the government’s solvency. However, unlike our default rule, theirs does
not consider the situation where inﬂation mitigates the pressure to increase default. In fact, as
pointed out by Reinhart and Rogoﬀ[29], there is a strong observed relationship between default
and inﬂation, with inﬂation in the year of default usually being quite high. Thus, our default rule
is more plausible than those in either Uribe[32] or Bi, Leeper, and Leith[10].
7The tax-to-debt ratio in Uribe[32] measures government solvency and corresponds to the second term in Eq.(15).
8There is a possibility that the default rate becomes negative; i.e., δ < 0. Uribe[32] interprets a negative default
rate as government subsidies for bond holders, and Uribe[31] proposes methods to solve the model with the constraint
δ ≥ 0. Under this constraint, the government decreases the tax which corresponds to the amount of negative default
when the default rate is about to be below zero. We oﬀer another suitable interpretation. The government budget
constraint Eq.(12) implies that government debt which will be redeemed increases and the government grants
additional government bonds households if the default rate becomes negative. These government bonds are ‘subsidy
bonds.’ In Japan, subsidy bonds are common and often issued to pay for contributions, condolence money, and loss
compensation, etc. The total amount of subsidy bonds issued in Japan was 4,250 billion Japanese yen from 1952
to 2017 with the balance of subsidy bonds outstanding being 194 billion Japanese Yen at the end of FY2017. See
Ministry of Finance in Japan[26] for details.
9Uribe[32] adopts default rules which depend on thresholds, dubbed ‘Default Rule 1’ and ‘Default Rule 2,’ the
ﬁrst depending on the ratio of the ﬁscal surplus over government debt and the second on the ratio of the ﬁscal
surplus over GDP. Under these two rules, default occurs if the ratio exceeds a threshold.
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2.2.3 Relationship between Default Rate and Fiscal Surplus
By leading Eq.(15) one period and plugging this back into Eq.(15), we can rewrite Eq.(15) as a
second-order diﬀerential equation as follows:
δt = 1−
1
RGt−1Π
−1
t Bt−1

SPt + βEt

Ct
Ct+1
Π−1t+1

RHt (1− δt+1)Bt

. (16)
In Eq.(16), current government debt Bt appears in the second term on the RHS and the sign
is negative. That is, a decrease in current government debt increases the default rate, and vice
versa. To keep Eq.(15), once government debt is issued, the ﬁscal surplus must be improved while
newly issued government debt is about to reduce the ﬁscal surplus. Because the ﬁscal surplus must
improve to redeem debt, the default rate declines because of an improvement in the ﬁscal surplus
when government debt increases. Thus, the sign is negative.
In addition, we can easily imagine that the ﬁscal surplus is a function of the output gap. In
fact, the log-linearized ﬁscal surplus is given by:
spt =
βτ
(1− β) ςB
τˆt +
βτ
(1− β) ςB
yt −
βςG
(1− β) ςB
gt. (17)
with ςB ≡
B
Y
and ςG ≡
G
Y
being the steady-state ratio of government debt to output and the
steady-state ratio of government expenditure to output, respectively, where τˆt ≡
dτt
τ
denotes
the percentage deviation of the tax rate from its steady-state value. We simply refer to the
percentage deviation of the tax rate from its steady-state value τˆt as the tax gap. By using Gali
and Monacelli’s[21] deﬁnition of the output gap–i.e., y˜t ≡ yt − y¯t, where y˜t and y¯t denote the
output gap and the natural rate of output, respectively–we can recognize that stabilizing the ﬁscal
surplus leads to the stabilization of the output gap.10
2.2.4 Log-linearizing the Government Budget Constraint
Log-linearizing Eq.(16) yields:
ct = Et (ct+1)− βrˆt + Et (πt+1)−
ωφ
1− β
bt + Et (δt+1)−
ωsp
β (1− β)
spt +
1
β
rˆt−1 −
1
β
πt
+
1
β
bt−1 −
1
β
δt −
φ
β
spt−1, (18)
with ωsp ≡ (1− β)
2
− φωγβ, where we use the log-linearized deﬁnition of the government debt
coupon rate. Eq.(18) is our log-linearized Euler equation.
2.3 Firms
This subsection outlines the production, price setting, marginal cost, and other features of the
ﬁrms, and these are quite similar to Gali and Monacelli[21], although here the tax is levied on ﬁrm
sales and is not constant.11
10In our model, the steady state is not eﬃcient because friction stemming from the monopolistically competitive
market cannot be dissolved by taxation. Thus, the target level of the output gap (or eﬃcient output gap) is not
zero, even though the target level is zero in Gali and Monacelli[21], because the steady state is eﬃcient.
11Unlike our setting, Gali and Monacelli[21] assume that under constant employment subsidies, monopolistic
power completely disappears.
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A typical ﬁrm in each country produces a diﬀerentiated good with a linear technology repre-
sented by the production function:
Yt (i) = AtNt (i) ,
where At denotes the productivity.
By combining the production function and the optimal allocation for goods, we have an aggre-
gate production function relating to aggregate employment as follows:
Nt =
YtZt
At
, (19)
where Zt ≡
 1
0


Pt(i)
Pt
−ε
di denotes the price dispersion.
Log-linearizing Eq.(19) yields:
nt = yt − at. (20)
We assume that productivity follows an AR(1) process; i.e., Et (at+1) = ρAat, similar to government
expenditure. Zt disappears in Eq.(15) because of o


ξ2

.
Each ﬁrm is a monopolistic producer of one of the diﬀerentiated goods and sets its prices Pt (i)
taking as given Pt and Ct. We assume that ﬁrms set prices in a staggered Calvo pricing fashion,
according to which each seller has the opportunity to change its price with a given probability
1− θ, where an individual ﬁrm’s probability of reoptimizing in any given period is independent of
the time elapsed since it last reset price. When a ﬁrm can set a new price in period t, it does so
to maximize the expected discounted value of its net proﬁts. The FONCs for ﬁrms are given by:
P˜t =
Et

∞
k=0 θ
kβkY˜t+k
ε
ε−1Pt+kMCt+k

Et

∞
k=0 θ
kβkY˜t+k
 , (21)
where MCt ≡
Wt
(1−τt)PtAt
denotes the real marginal cost which is common across ﬁrms, Y˜t+k ≡

P˜t
Pt+k
−ε
Yt+k denotes the demand for goods when ﬁrms choose a new price, and P˜t the newly set
prices. Note that we assume that government levies a tax on ﬁrm sales.
By log-linearizing Eq.(21), we have:
πt = βEt (πt+1) + κmct, (22)
with κ ≡ (1−θ)(1−θβ)
θ
being the slope of the New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC). Eq.(22) is the
fundamental equality of our NKPC.
Substituting Eq.(7) into the deﬁnition of the real marginal cost yields:
MCt =
CtN
ϕ
t
(1− τt)At
. (23)
Note that the marginal cost in the steady state, which is the inverse of a constant markup, is
smaller than one, while the gross tax rate 1− τ is deﬁnitely smaller than one. In such a case, the
steady-state wedge between the marginal product of labor and the marginal utility of consumption
is not unity. That is, monopolistic power remains because it is unable to be completely absorbed
through taxation. As we discuss later, we need to derive our welfare criteria following Benigno and
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Woodford[8] because monopolistic power is no longer removed completely, and the steady state is
distorted.
Log-linearizing Eq.(23) yields:
mct = ct + ϕyt +
τ
1− τ
τˆt − (1 + ϕ) at. (24)
2.4 Equilibrium
2.4.1 Market-Clearing Condition
The market-clearing condition requires:
Yt (i) = Ct (i) +Gt (i) ,
for all i ∈ [0, 1] and all t. By plugging the optimal allocation for generic goods including Eq.(5)
into this market-clearing condition, we have:
Yt = Ct +Gt. (25)
By log-linearizing Eq.(25), we obtain:
yt = ςCct + ςGgt, (26)
where ςC ≡ 1− ςG denotes the steady-state ratio of consumption to output.
2.4.2 Output, Nominal Interest Rate and Inﬂation Dynamics
Plugging Eq.(26) into Eq.(18) yields:
yt = Et (yt+1)− ςC rˆt + ςCEt (πt+1)−
ςCωφ
1− β
bt + ςCEt (δt+1) +
ςC
β
rˆt−1 −
ςC
β
πt +
ςC
β
bt−1
+
ςC
β
δt −
ςCωsp
β (1− β)
spt −
φςC
β
spt−1 + ςG (1− ρG) gt, (27)
where we assume that the government expenditure follows an AR(1) process and Et (gt+1) = ρGgt.
Plugging Eqs(24) and (26) into Eq.(22), we have:
πt = βEt (πt+1) +
κ [1 + ϕςC ]
1− ςG
yt +
κτ
1− τ
τˆt −
κςG
1− ςG
gt − κ (1 + ϕ) at. (28)
Eq.(28) stemming from the ﬁrms’ FONC Eq.(16) does not have any notable features.
3 Policy Target
We analyze three policies; i.e., OM, OMF, and MIS. This contrasts with Uribe[32], which analyzes
inﬂation stabilization policy including the Taylor rule and price level targeting, and an interest
rate peg that pegs both the nominal interest rate for safe assets and the nominal interest rate for
risky assets. Because the OM and OMF policies are both de facto inﬂation stabilization policies,
these clearly correspond to the Taylor rule and the price level targeting in Uribe[32]. At ﬁrst
glance, there is some diﬀerence between the interest rate peg in Uribe[32] and the MIS policy,
which minimizes the diﬀerence between the nominal interest rate rˆt–i.e., the interest rate for safe
assets–and the government debt yield rˆHt . However, both policies are intrinsically the same. The
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expected default rate converges to zero under the interest rate peg in Uribe[32] and the MIS policy
makes the expected default rate zero ex ante. In fact, as shown in Eqs(9) and (10), the expected
default rate Et (δt+1) should be zero if the nominal interest rate completely corresponds to the
government debt yield; i.e., Rt = R
H
t . Thus, the MIS policy imitates the interest rate peg in
Uribe[32] in this regard. 12
We now discuss the details of each policy. Under the MIS policy, the policy authorities minimize
the interest rate spread between the nominal interest rate and the government debt yield rˆSt ≡
rˆHt − rˆt over time. That is, they minimize the following:
LR ≡
∞
t=0
βtE0

LRt

(29)
with:
LRt ≡
1
2

rˆSt
2
.
Because of Eq.(10), the expected default rate will be zero under the MIS policy. As mentioned,
from the viewpoint of minimizing the expected default rate, this policy corresponds to the interest
rate peg in Uribe[32]. Note that Uribe[32] shows that the default rate is settled just one period
after an exogenous negative ﬁscal surplus shock under the interest rate peg. Because of the zero
expected default rate, default no longer occurs after the second period.
Under the OM and the OMF policies, the policy authorities minimize the welfare cost function
over time. We derive the period welfare cost function from the welfare criterion following Gali[19],
Benigno and Woodford[8], and Benigno and Woodford[33]. Note that we impose RGt = R
H
t when
we derive the second-order approximated intertemporal government solvency condition because of
the limits of our abilities. However, this restriction has no impact on our analyzing the SI—SD
trade-oﬀ because our welfare cost function implies that stabilizing inﬂation is almost the only
policy target, and this implies that the OM and OMF policies are de facto inﬂation stabilization
policies.13 In addition, as shown in Appendix F, our empirical analysis shows that the hypothesis
that the government bond yield is consistent with the coupon rate on the benchmark 10-year
government bond cannot be rejected for actual data from Italy, Spain, Germany, and the US. This
implies that RGt = R
H
t cannot be denied, in even countries facing signiﬁcant sovereign risk, such
as Italy and Spain. 14 Thus, we cannot necessarily say that we derive our welfare cost function
under a strong assumption.
Following Gali[19], the second-order approximated utility function is given by:
∞
t=0
βtE0

Ut − U
UCC

=
∞
t=0
βtE0

Φ
1− ςG
yt −
(1− Φ) (1 + ϕ)
ςC2
y2t +
(1− Φ) (1 + ϕ)
1− ςG
ytat
−
(1− Φ) ε
ςC2κ
π2t

+ t.i.p. + o


ξ3

, (30)
12Policy objectives in Uribe[32], such as price level targeting and the interest rate peg, are given exogenously.
However, unlike Uribe[32], we do not give policy objective exogenously because this generates indeterminacy. See
Gali and Monacelli[21].
13In this model, and similar to other DSGE models assuming nominal rigidities, the only practical friction is price
stickiness. Thus, our welfare cost function implies that stabilizing inﬂation is almost the only policy target. In fact,
our welfare cost function consists of just the quadratic term for inﬂation and the output gap from its target level
deﬁned later. The value of the coeﬃcient on the quadratic term of inﬂation is approximately 120.2, although the
value of the coeﬃcient on the quadratic term of the output gap from its target level is only approximately 2.4 under
our parameterization introduced in Section 5.1.
14We ﬁnd that the results are almost unchanged if we use data on shorter maturity government bonds. A notable
exception being Spain because it holds for 10-year maturity bonds, but not those for maturities of 2 and 5 years.
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where t.i.p. denotes the terms independent of policy, o


ξ3

are the terms of order three or
higher, and Φ ≡ 1− 1−τε
ε−1
denotes the steady-state wedge between the marginal rate of substitution
between consumption and leisure and the marginal product of labor. On the RHS, there are linear
terms
∞
t=0 β
tE0


Φ
1−ςG
yt

generating the welfare reversal.15 To avoid welfare reversal, we need
to eliminate the linear terms on the RHS in Eq.(30). Following Benigno and Woodford[8] and
Benigno and Woodford[33], the linear terms are rewritten as follows:
∞
t=0
βtE0

Φ
1− ςG
yt

= −
∞
t=0
βtE0

Φ [(1− τ ) (1 + ωg)ων1 − τωω1]
2Γς2C
y2t
−
Φ [ωω2τ − (1− τ) (1 + ωg)ων3]
Γς2C
ytgt −
Φ (1− τ) (1 + ωg)ων4
ΘςC
ytat
+
Φ(1− τ) (1 + ωg) ε (1 + ϕ)
2Θκ
π2t

+Υ0 + o


ξ3

,
with ωg ≡
G
SP
= βςG(1−β)ςB , Θ ≡ (1 + ωg) (1− τ) [1 + ςCϕ]+τ [1− ςC (1 + ωg)], ων1 ≡ ςCϕ [ςC (1 + 2ϕ) + 2 (2− ςG)],
ωω1 ≡ (1 + ςG) [1− ςC (1 + ωg)], ωω2 ≡ ςC [ςG (1 + ωg) + ωg]−2ςG, ων3 ≡ 1−ςC {ςG (1− 2ςG)− ϕ [ςG (2− ςG)− 2]},
and ων4 ≡ ϕςC [1 + 2 (1 + ϕ)] + (1 + ϕ) (2− ςG), where Υ0 ≡ −
τΦ
Γ(1−β)ω +
(1−τ)(1+ωg)Φ
Θκ ν denotes
a transitory component and ω and ν are the second-order approximated FONC for ﬁrms and the
second-order approximated solvency condition for the government. Plugging the previous equality
into Eq.(30) yields:
∞
t=0
βtE0

Ut − U
UCC

≃ −L+Υ0 + t.i.p. + o


ξ
3

,
where:
L ≡
∞
t=0
βtE0 (Lt) (31)
denotes the expected welfare costs:
Lt ≡
Λx
2
x2t +
Λπ
2
π2t ,
with Λx ≡
ωu1
Θς2
C
and Λπ ≡
ε[Φ(1−τ)(1+ωg)(1+ϕ)ςC+Θ(1−Φ)]
ΘκςC
, ωu1 ≡ Φ [(1− τ) (1 + ωg)ων1 − τωω1] +
(1− Φ) (1 + ϕ) ςCΘ, ωu2 ≡ ςC [Φ (1− τ ) (1 + ωg)ων4 + (1− Φ) (1 + ϕ)Θ], and ωu3 ≡ Φ [ωω2τ − (1− τ) (1 + ωg)ων3]
where Lt denotes the period welfare costs, xt ≡ yt − y
∗
t denotes the output gap from the target
level (OGTL), and y∗t ≡
ωu2
ωu1
at +
ωu3
ωu1
gt denotes the target level of output.
Here, we emphasize that analyzing the MIS policy is important. The most important reason
we analyze the MIS policy, which corresponds to the interest rate peg in Uribe[32], is to emphasize
that one of our results for OMF policy, being that it does not intend to suppress default, can well
stabilize the default rate, similarly to the MIS policy. Further, comparing the OM and OMF policies
with the MIS policy equates to comparing the inﬂation stabilization policy with an interest peg in
Uribe[32]. That is, we demonstrate that inﬂation stabilization policy–i.e., the OMF policy–can
dissolve the SI—SD trade-oﬀ, just as Uribe[32] emphasizes the SI—SD trade-oﬀ by comparing the
15The presence of linear terms generally leads to the incorrect evaluation of welfare, with a simple example of this
result proposed by Kim and Kim[23]. Tesar[30] used the log-linearization method and derived the paradoxical result
that an incomplete-markets economy produces a higher level of welfare than the complete-markets economy. Kim
and Kim[23] point out that the reversal of welfare ordering implies approximation errors owing to the linearization.
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OMF policy with the MIS policy. This method, used to show how the OMF policy dissolves the
SI—SD trade-oﬀ, makes this easy to understand because we can compare our results with those in
Uribe[32].
4 The LQ Problem
4.1 New Keynesian IS (NKIS), NKPC, Government Budget Constraint
and the Fiscal Surplus
Plugging the deﬁnition of the OGTL into Eq.(27) yields:
xt = Et (xt+1)− ςC rˆt + ςCEt (πt+1)−
ςC (1− β)
βφ
Et (δt+1) +
ςC
β
rˆt−1 −
ςC
β
πt +
ςCωo
β2φ
δt
−
ςC̟
β
spt +
ςC (ωγ − φβ)
β2
spt−1 + ǫx,t, (32)
with ωo ≡ β (1 + φ) − 1 and ̟ ≡ 2 (1− β) + βγ, where ǫx,t ≡ −
ωu2(1−ρA)
ωu1
at −
ωu3−ςGωu1(1−ρA)
ωu1
gt
denotes the demand shock. Note that we use Eqs(10) and (11) to derive Eq.(32). Eq.(32) is our
version of the NKIS curve. Because of our use of Eqs(10) and (11), the terms for the government
debt disappear in Eq.(32).
Plugging the deﬁnition of the OGTL into Eq.(28) yields:
πt = βEt (πt+1) +
κ (1 + ϕςC)
ςC
xt +
κτ
1− τ
τˆt + ǫπ,t, (33)
where ǫπ,t ≡
κ[(1+ϕςC)ωu3−ςGωu1]
ςCωu1
gt−
κ[(1+ϕςC)ωu2−(1+ϕ)ωu1]
ςCωu1
at denotes the cost-push shock. Eq.(33)
is our version of the NKPC.
Plugging Eqs(10) and (11) into Eq.(13) yields:
spt =
1
̟
rˆt−1 −
ωo
φβ̟
δt −
1
̟
πt +
ωγ − φβ
̟β
spt−1 +
1− β
φ̟
Et (δt+1) . (34)
Plugging the deﬁnition of the OGTL into Eq.(17) yields:
spt =
βτ
(1− β) ςB
τˆt +
βτ
(1− β) ςB
xt + ǫsp,t, (35)
where ǫsp,t ≡
βτ
(1−β)ςB
at −
β(ςGωu1−τωu3)
(1−β)ςBωu1
gt is the ﬁscal surplus shock.
4.2 FONCs for the Policy Authorities
The policy authorities minimize Eq.(31) under the OM and OMF policies, while they minimize
Eq.(29) under the MIS policy, subject to Eqs(32)—(35). Under the OM and MIS policies, the policy
instrument is just the nominal interest rate rˆt, and the tax gap τˆt is zero over time; i.e., the tax rate
is ﬁxed at its steady-state level. The policy authorities choose the sequence {xt, πt, rˆt, δt, spt}
∞
t=0.
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Under the OMF policy, the policy instruments are not only the nominal interest rate rˆt but also
the tax gap τˆt. The policy authorities select the sequence {xt, πt, rˆt, τˆt, δt, spt}
∞
t=0.
16Because government debt disappears in our model, at ﬁrst glance the policy authorities’ instrument is merely
the nominal interest rate. However, government debt is indirectly chosen by choosing the ﬁscal surplus and the
default rate.
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The OM and the OMF policies are then synonyms for an inﬂation stabilization policy because
the weight on the quadratic term of inﬂation in Eq.(31) is extremely high. However, there is
one policy instrument under the OM policy, while there are two policy instruments under the
OMF policy. This means that the OM policy regime lacks one of the available policy instruments
to conduct policy or to stabilize inﬂation, while the OMF policy regime is more aggressive in
stabilizing inﬂation than the OM policy regime. Thus, we can ﬁnd how stabilizing inﬂation aﬀects
the default rate through comparing the dynamics for both inﬂation and the default rate under
both policies.
4.2.1 FONCs under the OM Policy
Now, we show the FONCs under the OM policy. The FONCs for the OGTL and for inﬂation are
given by:
Λxxt = −µ1,t +
κ (1 + ϕςC)
ςC
µ2,t +
βτ
(1− β) ςB
µ4,t +
1
β
µ1,t−1, (36)
Λππt = −
ςC
β
µ1,t − µ2,t +
1
̟
µ3,t +
ςC
β
µ1,t−1 + µ2,t−1, (37)
where µ1,t, µ2,t, µ3,t, and µ4,t are the Lagrange multipliers on Eqs(32), (33), (34), and (35),
respectively. By following Benigno and Benigno[5], we can interpret Eqs(36) and (37) as the
targeting rule. Because of default risk, these FONCs are somewhat diﬀerent from the familiar ones.
However, by ignoring the Lagrange multipliers µ3,t and µ4,t, we can understand that inﬂation is
stabilized via stabilizing the OGTL because the Lagrange multipliers µ1,t and µ2,t are multiplied
on the NKIS Eq.(32) and NKPC Eq.(33). The mechanism for stabilizing inﬂation is similar to that
in the New Keynesian literature, including Benigno and Benigno[5].
The FONCs for the nominal interest rate and the default rate are given by:
ςCµ1,t = ςCEt (µ1,t+1) +
β
̟
Et (µ3,t+1) , (38)
ςCωo
φβ
µ1,t = −
ωo
̟
µ3,t −
ςC (1− β)
β
µ1,t−1 −
1− β
̟
µ3,t−1, (39)
where Eqs(38) and (39) are the FONCs for the nominal interest rate and the default rate, re-
spectively. These show that there is a close relationship between the NKIS in Eq.(32) and the
government budget constraint in Eq.(34). The FONC for the ﬁscal surplus is given by:
ςC̟
β
µ1,t = −µ3,t − µ4,t +
ςC (ωγ − φβ)
β
Et (µ1,t+1) +
ωγ − φβ
̟
Et (µ3,t+1) , (40)
which shows that changes in the ﬁscal surplus aﬀect the NKIS Eq.(32) and the government budget
constraint Eq.(34). In addition, Eqs(39) and (40) imply that changes in the ﬁscal surplus aﬀect
the default rate because of the Lagrange multipliers on the government budget constraint µ3,t and
the deﬁnition of the ﬁscal surplus µ4,t.
4.2.2 FONCs under the MIS Policy
The FONCs for the OGTL and for the inﬂation are given by:
µ1,t =
κ (1 + ϕςC)
ςC
µ2,t +
βτ
(1− β) ςB
µ4,t +
1
β
µ1,t−1, (41)
µ1,t = µ1,t−1 −
β
ςC
(µ2,t − µ2,t−1)−
β
ςC̟
µ3,t. (42)
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Eqs(41) and (42) are equivalent to Eqs(36) and (37) although inﬂation and the OGTL disappear
in Eqs(41) and (42) because the period loss function LRt does not include the quadratic terms for
inﬂation and the OGTL. That is, the policy authorities do not intend to stabilize both inﬂation
and the OGTL.
The FONCs for the nominal interest rate and the ﬁscal surplus are given by Eqs(38) and (40),
respectively, even under the MIS policy. The FONC for the default rate has distinctive features
and is given by:
δt = −
ςCωo
βφ
µ1,t −
ωo
φ̟
µ3,t −
ςC (1− β)
βφ
µ1,t−1 −
1− β
φ̟
µ3,t−1, (43)
which can be interpreted as a targeting rule under the MIS policy. As Eq.(10) implies, stabilizing
the default rate is essential to minimizing the interest rate spread. Recall that µ1,t and µ3,t are
Lagrange multipliers on Eqs(32) and (34); i.e., the NKIS and the log-linearized government budget
constraint. Thus, to stabilize the default rate, both the NKIS (its LHS is the output gap) and the
government budget constraint (its LHS is the ﬁscal surplus) must shift downward when the default
rate is about to increase, and vice versa, because the signs on the ﬁrst and second terms on the
RHS are negative. The negative sign on the ﬁrst term on the RHS implies that when the default
rate is about to increase, the output gap must decrease, and vice versa. If government expenditure
does not change, the decrease in the output gap coincides with the decrease in consumption. The
decrease in the consumption increases the discounted value of the sum of the ﬁscal surplus in
terms of consumption, or solvency. This improvement in solvency applies pressure to decreasing
the default rate and the default rate stabilizes.
The negative sign for the second term on the RHS implies that when the default rate is about
to increase, the ﬁscal surplus decreases. This is consistent with our intuition. If government
expenditure is constant, the ﬁscal surplus decreases when output decreases. A decrease in output
coincides with a decrease in consumption. As mentioned, a decrease in consumption increases the
ﬁscal surplus in terms of consumption or solvency and removes the pressure to increase the default
rate. Thus, the negative sign for the second term on the RHS is plausible.
4.2.3 FONCs under the OMF Policy
Under the OMF policy, the FONCs are given not only by Eqs(36)—(40), but also by the FONC for
the tax gap as follows:
µ2,t = −
(1− τ )β
(1− β) ςBκ
µ4,t.
As mentioned, µ2,t and µ4,t are Lagrange multipliers on NKPC Eq.(33) and the deﬁnition of the
ﬁscal surplus Eq.(35), respectively. This equality shows that changes in the ﬁscal surplus aﬀect the
NKPC via changes in the tax gap under the OMF policy. In the FONC for inﬂation Eq.(37), µ2,t
appears with a negative sign. By plugging this FONC into Eq.(37), we can see that the deﬁnition
of the ﬁscal surplus Eq.(35) must shift upward to stabilize inﬂation when inﬂation is about to
increase. Because the LHS of Eq.(35) is the ﬁscal surplus, this means that the ﬁscal surplus must
increase to stabilize inﬂation. However, this mechanism to stabilize inﬂation has another eﬀect.
As shown in Eq.(15) (i.e., our FTSR), an increase in the ﬁscal surplus decreases the default rate
and vice versa. Thus, stabilizing the ﬁscal surplus not only stabilizes inﬂation, but also suppresses
default under the OMF through manipulating the tax gap. Uribe[32] highlights the SI—SD trade-
oﬀ. However, by endogenizing production, which also endogenizes the ﬁscal balance, we ﬁnd that
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there is not necessarily an SI—SD trade-oﬀ. Under the OMF policy, the tax gap works not only to
stabilize inﬂation, but also to suppress default through stabilizing the ﬁscal balance.
5 Numerical Analysis
5.1 Parameterization
We run a series of dynamic simulations and adopt the following benchmark parameterization. The
calibrated parameters mainly follow Ferrero[18], who also analyzes optimal monetary and ﬁscal
policy, except for some unfamiliar parameters, which are estimated. These include the interest
rate spread for risky assets φ and the elasticity of the interest rate spread to a 1% change in the
ﬁscal deﬁcit γ and an important parameter for analyzing monetary policy, being the price stickiness
θ. In addition, we assume that productivity and government expenditure follow AR(1) processes,
and we estimate the persistence and standard errors of the innovations from the data.
Following Ferrero[18], the values for the subjective discount factor β, the elasticity of substitu-
tion across goods ε, the inverse of the labor supply elasticity ϕ, the steady-state ratio of government
debt to output ςB , the steady-state ratio of government expenditure to output ςG, and the steady-
state tax rate τ , are set to 0.99, 11, 0.47, 2.4, 0.276, and 0.3, respectively.17 Using our empirical
results for the Greek data reported in Appendices C and E, the spread of the nominal interest
rate φ, the elasticity of the interest rate spread to the ﬁscal deﬁcit γ, the price stickiness θ, the
persistence of productivity ρA, the persistence of government expenditure ρG, and the standard
errors of the innovations on productivity and government expenditure are set to 0.033, 1.1736,
0.705, 0.976, 0.927, 0.0316, and 0.0728, respectively.
5.2 Macroeconomic Dynamics
5.2.1 Macroeconomic Volatility and Correlation
We ﬁrst discuss macroeconomic volatility (Tab. 1). The inﬂation volatility under the MIS policy
is 0.8340 and is higher than under the OM policy, where it is 0.0012, even though the default
rate volatility under the OM policy is 1.4516 and higher than that under the MIS policy, which
is deﬁnitely zero. This implies that there is an SI—SD trade-oﬀ. If policy authorities choose
stabilizing inﬂation, they must give up suppressing default, and vice versa. This result is consistent
with Uribe[32]. However, by comparing the OM policy with the OMF policy, we recognize that
there is not necessarily an SI—SD trade-oﬀ. Note that both the OM and the OMF policies focus
on stabilizing inﬂation. While the OM policy has just one policy instrument, the OMF policy
has two policy instruments. Thus, the volatilities for the OGTL and inﬂation are deﬁnitely zero,
which means that the inﬂation—output gap trade-oﬀ is completely dissolved and that these are
smaller than the volatilities on the OGTL and inﬂation under the OM policy (0.0526 and 0.0012,
respectively). Notable results are the volatilities on default rate. The volatility under the OMF
policy is 0.2372, which is 83.7% smaller than under the OM policy. Because the volatility on
inﬂation under the OMF policy is deﬁnitely zero and smaller than under the OM policy, we can
say that there is not necessarily an SI—SD trade-oﬀ. This result is quite diﬀerent from Uribe[32].
17ςB = 2.4 is consistent with quarterly time periods in the model and implies that the annual steady-state
debt—output ratio is 0.6.
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We now discuss the correlation between selected variables (Tab. 2). The correlation between
inﬂation and default is -0.9634 under the OM policy. This implies that there is an SI—SD trade-oﬀ
as long as inﬂation is stabilized without operating the tax gap. This result is consistent with
Uribe[32]. Under the OMF policy, the correlation between the default rate and the ﬁscal surplus
is -0.2306, and the sign is negative. That is, the higher the ﬁscal surplus, the lower the default
rate, and vice versa. The correlation between the ﬁscal surplus and the tax gap is 0.2582, and
the sign is positive. This implies that the tax gap increases facing shocks that increase inﬂation
and that an increase in the tax gap contributes to an increase in the ﬁscal surplus. As shown
in the NKIS Eq.(32) and the NKPC Eq.(33), an increase in the ﬁscal surplus decreases inﬂation
through a decrease in the OGTL, and vice versa. Thus, inﬂation is stabilized through an increase
in the tax gap. In addition, an increase in the tax gap contributes to decreasing the default rate
through an increase in the ﬁscal surplus, as mentioned in Section 4.2.3. As shown in Eq.(35), an
increase in the tax gap increases the ﬁscal surplus and Eq.(34) shows that the higher the ﬁscal
surplus, the lower the default rate. Thus, the default rate is stabilized through an increase in the
tax gap. An increase in the tax gap then stabilizes both inﬂation and the default rate when facing
pressure to inﬂation. Stabilizing inﬂation is then consistent with suppressing default, and there is
not necessarily the SI—SD trade-oﬀ.
5.2.2 Impulse Response Functions
We discuss the impulse response functions (IRFs) and focus on a one-standard-deviation positive
change in government expenditure (Fig. 1). An increase in government expenditure applies pres-
sure to decrease the ﬁscal surplus and to increase the OGTL. Under the MIS policy, the default
rate is completely stabilized, while inﬂation severely ﬂuctuates (Panels 2 and 7). That is, there is
clearly an SI—SD trade-oﬀ. Similar to the MIS policy, the OM policy generates the SI—SD trade-oﬀ.
While inﬂation is more stable than under the MIS policy, the default rate severely rises (Panels
3 and 7). Under the OMF policy, however, while the default rate is not completely stabilized, it
is more stable than under the OM policy (Panel 7). In addition, inﬂation is completely stabilized
under the OMF policy (Panel 3). Thus, there is not necessarily an SI—SD trade-oﬀ.
How do changes in the steady-state ratio of government debt to output ςB and the steady-state
ratio of government expenditure to output ςG aﬀects model dynamics? According to OECD[27],
the ratio of government debt to output among its member countries varies from 0.127 in Estonia to
2.374 in Japan, while the ratio of government expenditure to output ranges from 0.033 in Columbia
to 0.571 in Finland. Thus, we select 0.5 and 9.5 as the low and high cases of the steady-state value
of the government debt to output, respectively, and 0.05 and 0.6 as the low and high cases of the
steady-state value of government expenditure to output, respectively, and discuss the IRFs under
these cases.18
We analyze changes in the steady-state ratio of government debt to output ςB . Generally, the
IRFs are not very diﬀerent between the low and high cases (Fig. 2). In both cases, the tax gap is
hiked in a similar way under the OMF policy and both inﬂation and default are stabilized. Next, we
analyze changes in the steady-state ratio of government expenditure to output ςG. Under the low
steady-state ratio of government expenditure to output, an increase in the government expenditure
makes the model less volatile due to the low elasticity of government expenditure to output; i.e.,
18The timing of the model is quarterly and the ratio of government debt to output 0.127 and 2.374 implies that
ςB = 0.510 and ςB = 9.496, respectively.
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the low steady-state ratio of government expenditure to output (Fig. 3). Because an increase in
government expenditure applies a quite small pressure to increase inﬂation under the low case of
the steady state value of the government expenditure to output, as shown in Eq.(28), the increase
in the tax gap needed to cancel this out is also very low, and the ﬁscal surplus evidently negative,
under the OMF policy, unlike the benchmark case (Panels 3 and 5 in Fig. 3). As a result, the
default rate severely increases as under the OM policy (Panel 4 in Fig. 3). Under the high steady-
state ratio of government expenditure to output, an increase in government expenditure applies
quite strong pressure to the increase in inﬂation, the increase in the tax gap is very high, and the
ﬁscal surplus evidently positive, under the OMF policy, unlike the benchmark case (Panels 8 and
10 in Fig. 3). As a result, the default rate severely decreases (Panel 9 in Fig. 3). In these cases,
the ﬁscal surplus is not stable, unlike the benchmark case, and the default rate not stabilized, even
under the OMF policy. Clearly, changes in the steady-state ratio of government debt to output ςG
aﬀect the dynamics under the OMF and generate the SI—SD trade-oﬀ.
6 The Trade-oﬀ between Stabilizing Inﬂation and Suppress-
ing the Default Rate
Is the SI—SD trade-oﬀ as severe as that highlighted by Uribe[32]? To respond, we calculate the
volatilities on both inﬂation and the default rate under various levels of price stickiness θ ranging
from 0.6 to 0.95 in increments of 0.05 (Fig. 4). Note that we just focus on a one-standard-deviation
positive change in government expenditure. Under the OM policy, there is clearly an SI—SD trade-
oﬀ (Panel 1). The higher the price stickiness, the higher the volatility on the default rate and
the lower the volatility on inﬂation, and vice versa. The higher the price stickiness, the higher
the weight on inﬂation in the period welfare costs Λπ. Thus, the higher the price stickiness, the
lower the volatility on inﬂation. However, as mentioned, aggressively stabilized inﬂation under the
OM policy induces high volatility on the default rate. Thus, there is clearly an SI—SD trade-oﬀ.
The volatility on inﬂation depends on the price stickiness under the MIS policy, similar to the
OM policy (Panel 2). However, unlike the OM policy, the default volatility does not depend on
the price stickiness and is deﬁnitely zero. In addition, the standard deviation of inﬂation is just
0.0070 when the price stickiness is 0.95. When the standard deviation of inﬂation is nearly zero
(3.4 × 10−4), the standard deviation of the default rate is 1.3649 under the OM policy when the
price stickiness is 0.95. Policy authorities may then choose the MIS policy rather than the OM
policy because default rate volatility is quite high under the OM policy. Uribe[32] then shows not
only the SI—SD trade-oﬀ, but also the suggestion of suppressing default by giving up on stabilizing
inﬂation. It seems that Uribe’s[32] suggestion is then not totally irrelevant, but may be realistic if
the price stickiness is suﬃciently high.
What about the SI—SD trade-oﬀ under the OMF policy? The inﬂation volatility is deﬁnitely
zero, and on the default rate, it is 0.0109, which is constant and does not depend on the price
stickiness (Panel 2). Of course, while inﬂation is completely stabilized, the volatility on the default
rate is quite low, but not zero. However, both inﬂation and default are well and aggressively
stabilized, unlike under the OM policy. Thus, we can state that there is not necessarily an SI—SD
trade-oﬀ. Or if there is an SI—SD trade-oﬀ, the SI—SD trade-oﬀ is not as severe as that suggested by
Uribe[32]. If price stickiness is suﬃciently high, and we adopt the MIS policy in place of the OMF
policy, both inﬂation and default rates are well stabilized, although the volatility of the former is
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not zero.
Next, we discuss the SI—SD trade-oﬀ under various steady state ratios of government debt to
output ςB ranging from 0.5 to 9.5 in increments of 0.5 and various steady state ratios of government
expenditure to output ςG ranging from 0.05 to 0.6 also in increments of 0.05 (Figs. 5 and 6). First,
we discuss on how changes in the steady state ratio of government expenditure to output ςB aﬀect
the SI—SD trade-oﬀ. Similar to the changes in price stickiness, there is an SI—SD trade-oﬀ under
the OM policy, while under the OMF policy both inﬂation and default rates are stabilized (Fig.
5).
How do changes in the steady state ratio of government expenditure to output ςG aﬀect the SI—
SD trade-oﬀ? Under the OM policy, the higher the ratio, the higher both the standard deviation
of the default rate and the standard deviation of inﬂation and vice versa. The higher the ratio,
the greater the pressure to increase inﬂation. Under a low ratio, inﬂation is stable because of
lesser pressure to increase inﬂation and the default rate does not rise as much (Panels 1, 2 and 4
in Fig.3). However, if the ratio is high, inﬂation is not as stabilized as under a low ratio and the
default rate rises because of the pressure to increase inﬂation (Panels 6, 7 and 9 in Fig.3). Thus,
the higher the ratio, the higher the standard deviations of the default rate and inﬂation (Panel 1
in Fig.6). The SI—SD trade-oﬀ is even more severe if the ratio is high. Under the MIS policy, the
standard deviation of the default rate is always zero, regardless of the ratio. However, the higher
the ratio, the greater the pressure to increase inﬂation and the higher the standard deviation of
inﬂation (Panel 2, Fig.6).
Under the OMF policy, inﬂation is completely stabilized and the standard deviation of inﬂation
is always zero. If the ratio is suﬃciently low, such as 0.05, the increase in the tax gap is quite
low and the ﬁscal surplus becomes obviously negative (Panel 5 in Fig.3). As a result, default
is inevitable (Panel 4 in Fig.3). If the ratio is 0.05, the standard deviation of the default rate
is 0.1838 (Panel 2 in Fig.6). However, the higher the ratio, the greater the pressure to increase
inﬂation. Thus, an increase in the tax gap is increasing in proportion to an increase in the ratio.
An increase in the tax gap improves the ﬁscal surplus and the ﬁscal surplus is almost stable if the
ratio is 0.276, which is the benchmark value (Panel 9, Fig.1). Because of a stable ﬁscal surplus,
the volatility of the default rate is 0.0817, which is quite low. The SI—SD trade-oﬀ then almost
dissolves. However, a further increase in the ratio heightens the pressure to increase inﬂation. To
cope with this, the tax gap is aggressively hiked and this increase in the tax gap turns the ﬁscal
surplus positive. As a result, the standard deviation of the default rate increases in proportion
to an increase in the ratio. For example, if the ratio is 0.4, the standard deviation of the default
rate is 0.8664. Finally, the standard deviation of the default rate is 6.0548 if the ratio is 0.6. The
steady-state ratio of government expenditure ςG aﬀects the SI—SD trade-oﬀ and if the ratio is far
enough from the benchmark value, the SI—SD trade-oﬀ cannot be solved by the OMF policy.
Which policy should we adopt? This cannot be judged unconditionally because the volatility
of the default rate is deﬁnitely not zero, even under the OMF, and we assume RHt = R
G
t , which
means that the government debt yield equals the government debt coupon rate when we derive the
welfare cost function Eq.(29). Thus, we cannot strongly recommend the adoption of the OMF from
the viewpoint of minimizing welfare costs. However, if RHt = R
G
t is applied, the policy target in our
analysis corresponds to the welfare costs. As also discussed, we cannot reject hypothesis RHt = R
G
t
in both Germany and the US or in Italy and Spain, where the latter face signiﬁcant sovereign
risk. Thus, even in countries such as Italy and Spain facing sovereign risk, we cannot deny that
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the government debt yield equals the government debt coupon rate. In that case, countries should
adopt the OMF policy, but not the MIS policy, from the viewpoint of minimizing welfare cost. As
mentioned, the SI—SD trade-oﬀ is aﬀected by the steady-state ratio of government expenditure to
output and the SI—SD trade-oﬀ cannot be solved by the OMF policy if this ratio is suﬃciently far
from the benchmark value. However, if the ratio ranges from 0.2 to 0.35, the standard deviation
of the default rate under the OMF policy is lower than the standard deviation of inﬂation rate
under the MIS policy. Thus, the OMF policy is not an inferior policy if the ratio is around the
benchmark value.
7 Conclusion
We develop a class of DSGE models with nominal rigidities and ﬁnd that: i) there is not necessarily
an SI—SD trade-oﬀ, and ii) the trade-oﬀ is not as severe as what Uribe[32] described. As policy
implications, we argue: i) we can practically solve the SI—SD trade-oﬀ by adopting the OMF policy,
and ii) the MIS policy is not an inferior policy from the viewpoint of dissolving the SI—SD trade-oﬀ
if the price stickiness is suﬃciently high.
While the ECB appears reluctant to stabilize inﬂation because of smoldering sovereign risk, our
results imply that there is another choice for policy authorities without becoming too concerned
about the SI—SD trade-oﬀ. That is, the OMF policy may be the ﬁrst option, and the policy
authorities should focus on stabilizing inﬂation through ﬁscal policy without hesitation even if there
is default risk. At the very least, we can surely maintain that the SI—SD trade-oﬀ is not as severe
as that suggested by Uribe[32]; therefore, we cannot support the assertion that simultaneously
stabilizing inﬂation and suppressing default is impossible.
In terms of future research directions, the welfare criteria and thus the welfare cost function
in this paper is not completely consistent with the household utility function. Deriving welfare
criteria that is completely consistent with the households’ utility function is then a possible avenue
of future work.
Appendices
A Counterfactual Exercises to Clarify Endogenized Fiscal
Surplus Yields Results Diﬀerent from Uribe[32]
Unlike Uribe[32], our model includes nominal rigidities and endogenized production. In addition,
the tax rate is not constant and debt coupon rate depends on the government’s ﬁscal situation.
To clarify how an endogenized ﬁscal surplus provides diﬀerent results to Uribe[32], this section
provides some counterfactual exercises.
A.1 Price Stickiness
We calculate the standard deviations of the default and inﬂation rates under price stickiness for
values ranging from 0.05 to 0.95 in increments of 0.05. The standard deviations of default rate
and inﬂation are always 0.2372 and 0.0000 under the OMF despite price stickiness, respectively,
as shown in Tab.1. The reason is that inﬂation is completely stabilized under the OMF and the
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tax gap is available as a policy tool to minimize the welfare costs function. Stabilizing inﬂation
completely implies that the eﬀects stemming from price stickiness are eliminated even if it is very
high. Thus, our results are not changed, even if price stickiness changes.
A.2 Constant Tax Rate
The tax rate is constant and the tax gap is not available as a policy tool under the OM, which
corresponds to inﬂation stabilization policies, such as the Taylor rule in Uribe[32], and diﬀerent
to the OMF. The standard deviations of the default rate and inﬂation under the OMF are always
0.2372 and 0.0000, respectively, and those under the OM are always 1.4516 and 0.0012, respectively.
Under the OMF policy, both default and inﬂation are well suppressed or stabilized. However, under
the OM, inﬂation is not necessarily very well stabilized and default is not suppressed. This means
that the role of tax gap is very important.
A.3 Debt Coupon Rate that Depends on the Government’s Fiscal Sit-
uation
In our model, the government debt coupon rate RGt does not necessarily correspond to the govern-
ment debt yield RHt . We show the result when the diﬀerence between R
G
t and R
H
t is minimized.
Suppose the policy authorities minimizing the period loss function as follows:
Lt ≡
Λx
2
x2t +
Λπ
2
π2t +
ΛC
2

rˆHt − rˆ
G
t
2
The policy minimizes this period loss function by controlling both the nominal interest rate and the
tax gap, meaning that the policy authorities conducting the OMF policy minimize the diﬀerence
between the government debt coupon rate and the government debt yield. When we set ΛC to
78, the mean of rˆHt − rˆ
G
t is 0.0007 and both the standard error and the variance of rˆ
H
t − rˆ
G
t are
0.0002 and 0.0000, respectively. This means that the diﬀerence between the government debt
coupon rate and the government debt yield is negligible, that is RHt = R
G
t is applicable. Under
this policy, the government issues its debt at the market price and the policy authorities conduct
the OMF. We report that the standard deviations of the default and inﬂation rates under the
OMF with a minimized diﬀerence between the government debt coupon rate and the government
debt yield are 0.0518 and 0.0001, 0.2372 and 0.0000 under the OMF and 1.4516 and 0.0012 under
the OM, respectively, as shown in Tab.1. Under the OMF with a minimized diﬀerence between
the government debt coupon rate and the government debt yield and the OMF, the standard
deviations of the default rate and inﬂation are both smaller than under the OM. Thus, the SI—SD
trade-oﬀ is dissolved or mitigated, at least under the OMF with a minimized diﬀerence between
the government debt coupon rate and the government debt yield, similar to the OMF. Further, the
standard deviation of the default rate under the OMF with a minimized diﬀerence between the
government debt coupon rate and the government debt yield is smaller than that under the OMF.
This means that our result is robust because the standard deviation of the default rate becomes
smaller and the SI—SD trade oﬀ more mitigated by assuming a setting closer to Uribe[32].
A.4 Endogenous Production
By assuming that there is no price stickiness and no diﬀerence between the coupon rate and the
government debt yield, we can obtain the results in a simple endogenous production setting. The
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results obtained are the same as the results of the OMF with a minimized diﬀerence between the
government debt yield RHt and the government debt coupon rate R
G
t with very low price stickiness.
We set the price stickiness θ to 0.001 and ΛC to 78. The mean of rˆ
H
t −rˆ
G
t is 0.0007 and the standard
error and variance of rˆHt − rˆ
G
t are 0.0002 and 0.0000, respectively. Note that we cannot solve the
model if we set price stickiness θ to zero and θ as 0.001. The standard deviations of the default
rate and inﬂation under the OMF are 0.2372 and 0.0000, respectively, while under the simple
endogenous setting they are 0.0518 and 0.0001, which is the same as the results in Section A.3.
Our results are thus unchanged even if we assume a simple endogenous production setting.
B Nonstochastic Steady State
We focus on equilibria where the state variables follow paths that are close to a deterministic
stationary equilibrium, in which Πt = 1 and
P˜t
Pt
= 1. Because this steady state is nonstochastic,
the productivity has unit values; i.e., A = 1. We assume that the default rate in the steady state
is zero; i.e., δ = 0.
In this steady state, the gross nominal interest rate is equal to the inverse of the subjective
discount factor, as follows:
R = β−1.
Eq.(21) can be rewritten as:
P˜t = Et

Kt
P−1Ft

(B.1)
with:
Kt ≡
ε
ε− 1
∞
k=0
(Pt+kCt+k)
−1
Y˜t+kMC
n
t+k ; Ft ≡ Pt
∞
k=0
(Pt+kCt+k)
−1
Y˜t+k,
which implies that:
K =
ε
ε−1YMC
n
(1− αβ) (PC)
; F =
PY
(1− αβ) (PC)
.
These equalities imply that:
P =
ε
ε− 1
MCn.
Thus, we have:
MC =

ε
ε− 1
−1
. (B.2)
Furthermore, Eqs23) and (B.2) imply the following:
CNϕ =
1− τ
ε
ε−1
. (B.3)
Eq.(B.3) implies the familiar expression:
(1− τ )UC =
ε
ε− 1
UN .
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Note that because τ ∈ (0, 1) and ε > 1, this steady state is distorted.
Eq.(12) yields the following:
B

1− β
β

= SP, (B.4)
with B ≡ B
n
P
.
Note that R = RH because of δ = 0 and RG = RΓ (0). Plugging this into Eq.(14) yields:
C−1RΓ (0)B = C−1SP +
β
Γ (0)
C−1SP +

β
Γ (0)
2
C−1SP + · · · . =
1
1− β [Γ (0)]
−1C
−1SP,
which implies:
Γ (0)Bβ−1 =
1
1− β [Γ (0)]−1
SP. (B.5)
Plugging Eq.(5) into this equality yields:
Γ (0) =
1− β
1− β [Γ (0)]
−1 ,
which implies that Γ (0) = 1. Thus, our assumption that δ = 0 is consistent with Γ (0) = 1.
Because of Γ (0) = 1, RG = R. Thus,
RG = RH . (B.6)
In the steady state, Eq.(15) reduces to:
1 =
1
1−β R
H
RG
 C−1SP 
C−1RB
. (B.7)
Note that the RHS in Eq.(B.7) corresponds to the steady-state value of Ψ. That is, Ψ = 1 is
applied in the steady state. This implies that the default rate is zero in the steady state.
C Empirical Evidence for the Calibrated Unfamiliar Param-
eters and AR(1) Processes
One of our calibrated parameters, the elasticity of the interest rate spread to the ﬁscal deﬁcit γ,
draws on the following regression:
CRRisky − CRt
X¯
= α0 + α1 (1−DUMt) dft + α2DUMt + α3DUMtdft, (C.1)
where CRriskyt corresponding to R
G
t denotes the nominal coupon rate for risky assets, CRt the
nominal coupon rate for safety assets, DUMt is a Greek crisis dummy variable that takes a value of
one for the period from May 2010 to June 2012 and zero otherwise (detailed explanation provided
below), and X¯ denotes the average of CRRiskyt − CRt for the period of DUMt = 1. α1 and α3
measure how changes in the percentage deviation of the ﬁscal deﬁcit dft ≡ −spt widen or narrow
the interest rate spread (coupon rate based) CRriskyt −CRt. Although these coeﬃcients correspond
to γ, we focus on α3 because it is the elasticity during the severe debt crisis. Speciﬁcally, α3 can
be regarded as
d(CRRiskyt −CRt)
d(dft)
1
CR
Risky
t −CRt
, which is consistent with our assumption of γ.
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Data are monthly and retrieved from Thomson Datastream, and we use the coupon rate spread
between the 10-year government bond for Greece and that for Germany and the real government
budget balance in Greece.19 The sample period is from January 2005 to April 2015. Note that the
Athens Olympics were in January 2005, at the beginning of the period when the unhealthy ﬁscal
deﬁcit started. The real government budget balance is seasonally adjusted and Hodrick—Prescott
(HP) ﬁltered. We assign DUMt = 1 during May 2010 to June 2012, otherwise DUMt = 0. Note
that Greece requested ﬁscal support from both the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the
ECB in April 2010, May 2010 was the following month, and Greece decided to adopt a reduced
budget following the results of the poll in June 2012. That is, DUMt = 1 is assigned during the
severe debt crisis in Greece.
The estimators on α0, α1, α2, and α3 are 0.0802, 0.0144, 0.8651, and 1.1736, respectively. The
corresponding standard errors are 0.0188, 0.0012, 0.0211, and 0.0955, respectively. All coeﬃcients
are signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The result that α3 is signiﬁcant implies that the elasticity of the
interest rate spread (coupon rate based) to the ﬁscal deﬁcit γ is signiﬁcant during the severe debt
crisis when the nominal interest rate rose rapidly, and its elasticity is 1.1736. Thus, we set γ to
1.1736. Because γ is signiﬁcant during May 2010 to June 2012, we regard the average of the spread
CR
risky
t −CRt as the risk premium, and we ﬁnd that the interest rate spread for risky assets φ is
0.033.
AR(1) processes are also estimated from the data for real GDP, the GDP deﬂator, nominal
government expenditure and employment in Greece retrieved from IMF World Economic Out-
look, and the sample period is from January 2005 to April 2015. Productivity is GDP divided by
employment and real government expenditure is nominal government expenditure divided by the
GDP deﬂator. The generated data are HP ﬁltered. Our results for the persistence of productiv-
ity ρA and the persistence of government expenditure are 0.976 and 0.927, respectively, and the
innovations for productivity and government expenditure are 0.0316 and 0.0728, respectively, as
mentioned in Section 5.1.
As we discussed in Section 2.1, our assumption concerning the elasticity of the interest rate
spread to the ﬁscal deﬁcit γ > 1 is supported by the data. This is because the t-statistic for the
null hypothesis α3 = 1 against the alternative hypothesis α3 > 1 is 1.8182, and its corresponding p-
value is 0.0359, and thus α3 > 1 is supported statistically. Note that as mentioned, α3 corresponds
to γ.
D Empirical Evidence for Government Debt with Interest
Payment as an Argument for Γ (·)
Similar to Eq.(C.1), we estimate the following:
CRRisky − CRt
X¯
= α˜0 + α˜1 (1−DUMt) rbt + α˜2DUMt + α˜3DUMtrbt,
where α˜1 and α˜3 measure how changes in the percentage deviation of government debt with
interest payment from its steady-state value rbt ≡
RtBt
RB
− 1 widen or narrow the coupon rate
spread CRriskyt − CRt. Thus, α˜1 and α˜3 correspond to γ. Data are quarterly and retrieved
from Thomson Datastream, and we use the sum of government debt and the government interest
19The original data include the nominal government budget balance, which we deﬂate using the CPI.
27
payment divided by the CPI in Greece. The generated data are HP ﬁltered. The sample period runs
from Q1, 2005 to Q1, 2015 because data on government debt and interest payment are available
in quarterly frequency. We assign DUMt = 1 during Q2, 2010 to Q2, 2012, otherwise DUMt = 0.
The estimation procedure is the same as Eq.(C.1).
The estimators on α˜0, α˜1, α˜2, and α˜3 are 0.0518, -1.5522, 0.9727, and 1.5428, respectively.
The corresponding standard errors are 0.0687, 1.5492, 0.0735, and 1.8895, respectively. That α˜1
and α˜3 are not signiﬁcant means that γ cannot be estimated if we assume that the argument for
Γ (·) is government debt with interest payment in Greece. This estimation result and the result on
Appendix C imply that the (negative) ﬁscal surplus as an argument for Γ (·) is plausible, although
government debt with interest payment as an argument for Γ (·) is not plausible.
E Empirical Evidence for Price Stickiness
Following Gali and Gertler[20] and Benigno and Lopez-Salido[7], we estimate an equation as follows:
Et [θπt − θ0.99πt+1 − (1− θ) (1− θ0.99)mct] = 0. (E.1)
The estimation method is the generalized method of moments developed by Hansen[22]. We use
quarterly data for Greece for the GDP deﬂator and nominal unit labor cost retrieved from Thomson
Datastream, both seasonally adjusted. The sample period runs from Q1, 2005 to Q3, 2015. The
rate of change in the GDP deﬂator is regarded as the data series for inﬂation πt. We deﬂate
the nominal unit labor cost by the GDP deﬂator to generate the real unit labor cost. Finally,
we calculate the percentage deviation of the marginal cost from its steady-state value following
mct =
MCt−MC
HP
t
MCHPt
, where MCHPt is the HP-ﬁltered real marginal cost.
To estimate, πt−1, πt−2, mct−1, and mct−2 are designated as instrumental variables. We use
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent standard errors. The spectral estimation method
is the quadratic spectral kernel, and the bandwidth parameter is selected using the Andrews[1]
procedure. The J-statistic for the validity of overidentifying restrictions is 2.03, and the associated
p-value is 0.56. This suggests that the above equation is successfully estimated.
As estimation results, we obtain the estimator 0.705 and standard error 0.206. Because the
p-value is 0.001, our estimator is signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
F Empirical Evidence for the Relationship between the Re-
demption Yield and the Coupon Rate
We estimate an equation as follows:
rHt = β0 + β1r
G
t ,
where rHt and r
G
t denote the yield and the coupon rate on benchmark 10-year government bonds,
respectively. Here, the coupon rate is the monthly average. We use monthly data for the PIIGS–
i.e., Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, and Spain–and Germany and the US, and retrieve the data
from Thomson Datastream. The sample period runs from January 2005 to September 2015. We
verify β0 = 0 and β1 = 1, which implies that the yield equals the coupon rate on average. Our
results for β0 in Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, Spain, Germany, and the US are 9.501, 0.353,
-5.419, 7.939, 0.353, -0.176, and 0.129, respectively, and the corresponding standard errors are
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4.349, 0.542, 2.718, 3.898, 0.542, 0.131, and 0.089, respectively. The estimator for β0 in Portugal,
Ireland, and Greece is signiﬁcant at the 5% level, while the remainder are not signiﬁcant. Our
results for β1 in Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, Spain, Germany, and the US are -0.919, 0.893,
2.204, 0.350, 0.893, 1.020, and 0.960, respectively, and the standard errors are 0.852, 0.126, 0.659,
1.0418, 0.126, 1.020, and 0.960, respectively. We cannot reject that β1 = 1 in Italy, Ireland, Spain,
Germany, and the US and the estimators are signiﬁcant at the 1% level, while the estimator on β1
in Portugal and Greece is not signiﬁcant.
We also conduct F-tests for the null hypothesis that β0 = 0 and β1 = 1, and obtain F-statistics
of 2.670, 0.567, 3.036, 5.187, 0.567, 2.584, and 1.082 for Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, Spain,
Germany, and the US, respectively. The p-values are 0.073, 0.568, 0.052, 0.007, 0.569, 0.079 and
0.342 for Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, Spain, Germany, and the US, respectively. Because the
F-statistics in Greece are signiﬁcant at the 1% level, we cannot accept our hypothesis rHt = r
G
t for
Greece.
Summarizing our results, the hypothesis β0 = 0 and β1 = 1 is supported in Italy, Spain,
Germany, and the US. That is, roughly speaking, the yield is consistent with the coupon rate
on benchmark 10-year government bonds in these countries. However, in Portugal, Ireland, and
Greece, the yield is not consistent with the coupon rate on the benchmark 10-year government
bond.
An important issue is that this empirical analysis draws on data for 10-year government bonds
whereas our model includes only one-period bonds. To conﬁrm the robustness of the empirical
results, we re-estimate the above equation using the data on government bonds with maturities
of 2 and 5 years. Unfortunately, coupon rate data on government bonds with maturities shorter
than 10 years are not available for Greece. We ﬁnd that the results remain almost unchanged if
we use government bonds with a shorter maturity (an exception is Spain). The results obtained
are not provided in this paper, but are available from the authors upon request. For a notable
approach to incorporating long-term debt into quantitative analyses of sovereign debt and default,
see Chatterjee and Eyingungor[12]. We defer this to future research.
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Table 1: Macroeconomic Volatility
Variable OM OMF MIS
xt 0.0526 0.0000 0.2126
πt 0.0012 0.0000 0.8340
rˆt 0.0077 0.0085 0.8124
τˆt NA 0.2336 NA
δt 1.4516 0.2372 0.0000
spt 2.6390 0.6411 0.7628
rˆSt 0.1360 0.0085 0.0000
Table 2: Correlation between Selected Variables
Variable Policy xt πt rˆt τˆt δt spt rˆ
S
t
xt OM 1.0000
OMF 1.0000
MIS 1.0000
πt OM -0.1683 1.0000
OMF NA 1.0000
MIS 0.4702 1.0000
rˆt OM 0.2227 -0.5792 1.0000
OMF NA NA 1.0000
MIS 0.4382 0.9994 1.0000
τˆt OM NA NA NA 1.0000
OMF NA NA 0.7961 1.0000
MIS NA NA NA 1.0000
δt OM 0.1571 -0.9634 0.5629 NA 1.0000
OMF NA NA -0.2369 -0.3981 1.0000
MIS NA NA NA NA 1.0000
spt OM -0.7879 0.2589 -0.7309 NA -0.2498 1.0000
OMF NA NA -0.3790 0.2582 -0.2306 1.0000
MIS 0.6670 -0.3432 -0.3767 NA NA 1.0000
rˆSt OM -0.6733 0.3531 0.2786 NA -0.3322 0.1411 1.0000
OMF NA NA 0.9798 0.6592 -0.1630 -0.5562 1.0000
MIS NA NA NA NA NA NA 1.0000
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Figure 1: IRFs to Government Expenditure under the Benchmark
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Figure 2: IRFs to Government Expenditure under a Low Ratio of Government Debt to Output
(ςB = 0.5, Upper Panels) and a High Ratio of Government Debt to Output (ςB = 9.5, Lower
Panels)
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Figure 3: IRFs to Government Expenditure under a Low Ratio of Government Expenditure to
Output (ςG = 0.05, Upper Panels) and a High Ratio of Government Expenditure to Output
(ςG = 0.6, Lower Panels)
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Figure 4: The Trade-oﬀ between Stabilizing Inﬂation and the Default Rate Volatilities under
Various Levels of Price Stickiness
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Figure 5: The Trade-oﬀ between Stabilizing Inﬂation and the Default Rate Volatilities under
Various Levels of the Steady State Ratio of Government Debt to Output
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Figure 6: The Trade-oﬀ between Stabilizing Inﬂation and the Default Rate Volatilities under
Various Levels of the Steady State Ratio of Government Expenditure to Output
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